2010 OCT 22 PM 1: 47 1 STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP Collier Center 201 East Washington Street, Suite 1600 2 JEANNE HICKS, GLER Phoenix, Arizona 85004-2382 Telephone: (602) 257-5200 Facsimile: (602) 257-5299 4 Court email: phcourtnotices@steptoe.com 5 David J. Bodney (006065) Peter S. Kozinets (019856) 6 Aaron J. Lockwood (025599) 7 Attorneys for Western News&Info, Inc. 8 ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT 9 YAVAPAI COUNTY 10 No. P1300CR20081339 STATE OF ARIZONA. 11 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF Plaintiff. 12 WESTERN NEWS&INFO, INC.'S JCATION FOR LEAVE TO VS. 13 INTERVENE FOR LIMITED STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER. PURPOSE OF MOVING TO 14 UNSEAL COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS Defendant. 15 (Assigned to the Honorable 16 Warren R. Darrow) [Expedited Oral Argument 17 Requested] 18

SUPERIOR COURT

Preliminary Statement

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In responding to WNI's Application, the State agrees that the Court should review the sealed records and proceedings, make the necessary factual findings that might justify any continued closure and release the remainder. For his part, however, Defendant advances the extreme proposition that public access to all materials that have been sealed to date should be foreclosed – notwithstanding decades of First Amendment and Arizona jurisprudence to the contrary. Defendant makes that assertion without showing that the Court provided notice and made on-the-record findings, as required by the First Amendment and Arizona law, *before* sealing each of the records listed in Exhibit 1 to WNI's Application. Defendant also fails to establish that whatever

compelling interests might be at stake would in fact be injured by disclosure – or could not be protected by less restrictive means. The only case Defendant cites specifically recognizes that such findings must be made, and that the Court must consider alternatives to secrecy. Moreover, Defendant's mere assertion of his fair trial right, without any support, is insufficient to deny public access. His contentions that a proper review of each sealed record is somehow impossible, and that WNI's Application is untimely, also lack merit. Accordingly, WNI asks the Court to review the sealed records, and release those that fail to meet the high hurdles for closure.

Argument

I. THE STANDARDS FOR CLOSURE UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ARIZONA LAW HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

The parties have not – and cannot – dispute that the First Amendment requires this Court to provide public notice and make specific findings that the closure of a judicial record is essential to preserve a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) ("*Press-Enterprise II*"). Likewise, the parties do not dispute Arizona's constitutional right of access. *See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n*, 160 Ariz. 350, 354-55, 773 P.2d 455, 459-60 (1989) (noting that Ariz. Const., art. II, § 6 is broader than the First Amendment, and that Arizona courts recognized a constitutional right of access nearly ten years before that right was found in the First Amendment). To overcome the strong presumption of open records under Arizona law, the Court must demonstrate specifically how disclosure of *each* record at issue would harm interests of privacy, confidentiality or the best interests of the state. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 123(c)(1).

Defendant cannot satisfy these stringent standards merely by invoking his fair trial right. [Objection at 2.] In *Press-Enterprise II*, the Supreme Court made clear that, if the interest asserted is the right to a fair trial, closure must be based on "specific findings" that there is a "substantial probability" that Defendant's right to a fair trial "will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent" and that "reasonable

alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights." 478 U.S. at 14. Yet Defendant offers *no* explanation of how unsealing the records would prejudice his case. This first-degree murder trial has been highly publicized since its inception. How any additional media coverage or public scrutiny would infringe Defendant's rights is entirely unclear, especially when the jurors presumably have been admonished to rely only on the information obtained in the courtroom and to disregard media coverage. Rather than identify facts showing a "substantial probability" of harm, Defendant vaguely refers to, among other topics that supposedly justify sealing, "counsel-related issues" and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.9. [Objection at 3.] Without specifics, Defendant fails to meet the high standard for closure set forth in *Press-Enterprise II* and the other authorities cited in WNI's Application.

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Defendant's argument that compliance with the First Amendment and Arizona law is procedurally "not possible" is equally unavailing. [Id. at 3.] WNI is unaware of any case law supporting the notion that First Amendment rights may be violated if complying with the Constitution poses an added administrative burden. Cf. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. District Court, 156 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1998) (the First Amendment's substantive and procedural requirements "are not mere punctilios, to be observed when convenient"). To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit in *United States v*. Blagojevich – the only case on which Defendant relies – recognized that "a judge not only must make the [required] findings...but also must consider alternatives to secrecy, whether or not the lawyers propose some." 612 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2010). The Blagojevich court remanded for a prompt, public hearing and appropriate factual findings on the record. See id. at 564 (holding that, without such findings, the presumption in favor of disclosure had *not* been rebutted). In any event, Defendant's Objection provides at least one way of addressing the sealed records – that is, by grouping them topically. [Objection at 3 ("[T]hese five categories may overlap with each other, but we found this a helpful way to attempt to look at the specific sealed documents and proceedings.").]

II. WNI'S APPLICATION IS TIMELY, AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN WAIVED.

Defendant's contention that WNI's Application is untimely lacks merit. Courts routinely permit interveners to attack overly broad sealing or protective orders well after issuance. "Indeed, delays measured *in years* have been tolerated where an intervener is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records." *San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. District Court*, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (citing *Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.*, 858 F.2d 775, 785 (1st Cir. 1988) (collecting cases)). WNI cannot be accused of sitting idly on its hands when the sealing started only a few months ago. [*See* Objection at 2-3 (explaining that most sealing started with "jury issues" in May 2010).] Then, WNI discovered that a large percentage of the September filings had been simply "purged from the file." WNI filed its Application immediately thereafter to assert its, and the public's, right of access. *See* Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order 95-35 at 1 (news organizations play an important role in conveying information to the public about the judiciary, and are uniquely situated to advocate for open courtroom proceedings). Under these authorities, WNI's Application is unquestionably timely and appropriate.

Defendant's reliance on *Blagojevich* for this point is again misplaced. In holding that the motion to intervene *was* timely, the *Blagojevich* court noted that the "trial is ongoing" and that "the controversy is live." 612 F.3d at 560. Significantly, the court did *not* find that interveners had waived their rights by failing to intervene earlier when the judge "mused in open court" about the possibility of sealing juror identities. *Id.* Rather, the Seventh Circuit found that, because there was never a public announcement identifying the juror issue and specifying a schedule for its resolution, the trial judge had abused his discretion by denying the motion to intervene. *Id.* at 561. In this case, WNI and the public have similarly been denied an opportunity to participate *before* many of the records and proceedings were sealed.

III. EVEN IF SOME INFORMATION WARRANTS SEALING, THE LAW REQUIRES THAT ONLY TRULY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL BE REDACTED AND THE REMAINDER RELEASED.

Both parties have indicated that an undefined number of records and proceedings are sealed to protect juror identities consistent with the Court's May 6, 2010 Order. Although some portion of these records may warrant sealing under the First Amendment and Arizona law (cf. A.R.S. § 21-312), the Order lacks all of the required on-the-record findings. E.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 156 F.3d at 949 (identification of compelling interest and lack of alternative means of protecting that interest); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 123(d) ("[T]he court shall state the reason for the action, including a reference to any statute, case, rule or administrative order relied upon."). Instead, the Order simply directs the clerk to seal certain Minute Entries that "may" disclose juror identity and information. With such a broad sealing order in place, WNI cannot verify which records are sealed for "juror issues" or fall into the four other categories of sealed documents identified by Defendant. [Objection at 2-3.]

Moreover, the May 6 Order asks the clerk to seal the *entirety* of the subject Minute Entries. The Court, however, must explore alternatives to wholesale closure, including the redaction of confidential information only. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 123(f)(4)(B). To the extent confidential information, including juror names, could be redacted from the sealed records and proceedings, and the remainder released, WNI asks that the Court do so. Once the necessity for closure no longer exists, WNI also asks that all records and proceedings be unsealed. *Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.*, 156 F.3d at 947-48.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant WNI's Application, review the sealed records and proceedings, make the required on-the-record findings and seal only those records, or portions of them, that truly merit closure under the First Amendment and Arizona law.

1	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of October, 2010.	
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9	Clerk of the Court	
10	Yavapai County Superior Court 120 South Cortez St. Prosect Aging 86203	
11	Prescott, Arizona 86303	
12	COPY of the foregoing hand delivered this 22nd day of October, 2010 to:	
13	Hon. Warren R. Darrow	
14	Judge Pro Tem B 120 South Cortez St. Prescott, Arizona 86303	
15	·	
16	COPIES of the foregoing sent via U.S. mail this 22nd day of October, 2010 to:	
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